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We develop a model of school choice in which the demand for religious schooling is 
driven partly by the desire of parents to limit their children’s exposure to the influences of 
competing religions.  This framework links the literature on the effects of religious market shares 
on the within-denomination intensity of religious activity with a separate literature relating 
religious pluralism to the overall level of religious participation.  The model predicts that when a 
religious group’s share of the local population grows, the fraction of that group’s members 
whose children attend religious schools decreases.  In addition, it implies that the overall demand 
for religious schooling is a positive function of both the local religiosity level and the level of 
religious pluralism, as measured by a Herfindahl Index.  Using both U.S. county-level data and 
individual data from ECLS-K and NELS:88, we find evidence strongly consistent with the 
model’s predictions.  Our findings also illustrate that failing to control for the local religiosity 
level in estimating the effect of religious pluralism on religious participation, as is common in 
previous studies, may lead a researcher to erroneously conclude that pluralism has a negative 
effect on participation.   
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1. Introduction 
A large literature in economics and the sociology of religion examines the relationship 
between religious market share – the proportion of people in a geographical area who belong to a 
given denomination – and religious participation within that denomination.  Most studies find 
that religious participation is negatively related to market share.  For example, Bisin and Vardier 
(2000) present evidence that, compared to cultural majorities, minority groups exercise greater 
efforts to prevent their children from “marrying out”.  Similarly, Bisin et al. (2004) estimate a 
structural model of marriage and child socialization in the United States, finding that “as a group 
grows towards being a majority, marriage segregation and socialization efforts become 
decreasing in the group’s population share” (p. 618).  Iannaccone (1991) finds that among 
seventeen Western countries, religious commitment among Protestants decreases as the 
Protestant share in the population grows.
1  However, some authors find a positive association 
between within-denomination participation and market share; for example, Phillips (1998) finds 
greater rates of Church activity among Mormons in areas with large Mormon market shares.  
A related debate among sociologists focuses on the effects of religious pluralism on 
religious participation.  Traditionally, sociologists (cf. Berger, 1969) have argued that an increase 
in religious pluralism decreases participation since it undermines the plausibility of belief, 
causing religion to lose its power as an absolute truth.  On the other hand, “rational choice” 
theories of religious competition suggest that pluralism increases overall religious participation 
by fostering competition, which makes each religious group work harder to attract adherents 
                                                             
1 Along similar lines, Abramitzky et al. (2010) find that American Jews are more likely to celebrate Hanukkah if 
they live in areas with relatively low Jewish market shares, suggesting that one role for the celebration of religious 
holidays is to counteract the effects of outside religious influences.  Among sociologists, Stark (1992) shows that 
among forty-five traditionally Christian countries, the Catholic share varies inversely with the ratio of priests to 
parishioners, and Stark and McCann (1993) find that Catholic commitment is inversely related to the proportion of 
Catholics in the population.  Zalenski and Zech (1995) find that both Catholics and Mainline Protestants have higher 
rates of financial giving in areas where they are a small proportion of the population.   3   
(Finke and Stark, 1988, 1989, 2002).  In addition, religious pluralism may increase religious 
participation by expanding an individual’s religious choice set, thereby increasing the likelihood 
of becoming involved in at least one religious group.  
A large number of empirical studies have explored these issues.  In an overview of the 
literature, Chaves and Gorski (2001) found 193 separate tests of the relationship between 
pluralism and participation.  These studies typically measure pluralism by a Herfindahl index of 
the market shares of the different denominations in the local population, and participation is 
defined as the fraction of the population who are religious adherents (regardless of 
denomination).  Some of these studies find a positive association between pluralism and 
participation (Hamberg and Pettersson, 1994; Finke, Guest, and Stark, 1996; North and Staha, 
2004) while others find a negative association (Breault, 1989a, 1989b; Bruce, 1992; Chaves and 
Cann, 1992; Olson, 1999; Borgonovi, 2008).  However, a seminal paper by Voas et al. (2002) 
argues that the majority of these estimates, both positive and negative, capture nothing more than 
spurious correlations between pluralism and participation.  Specifically, participation rates and 
pluralism are mechanically correlated when they are measured using the same membership data 
(Hungerman, 2010).  Moreover, Hungerman (2010) also notes that the relationship between 
participation and pluralism is not grounded in any formal economic theory of participation.    
In this paper, we develop a model of school choice that connects the literature on the 
relationship between pluralism and participation to the literature on the effects of religious 
market share on within-denomination participation.  The model explicitly incorporates the role of 
education in preserving religious identity.
2  It also incorporates multiple denominations, 
                                                             
2 As such, we extend previous studies of school choice that abstract from the religious motive in private education 
by modeling the demand for private schooling as motivated by differences in desired school quality (see Rangazas, 
1995, and Epple and Romano, 1996, among others).  Religious content and scholastic achievement are not 
contradictory goals, and evidence has shown that scholastic achievement in religious schools is greater than in 4   
extending Cohen-Zada’s (2006) framework that allowed for only two types of households 
(religious and non-religious) and three types of schools (public, private secular and private 
religious).  
We posit that parents’ decisions to send their children to religious schools reflect a desire 
to preserve their religious identity by shielding their children from the outside influences of 
competing religions.  An important implication of this desire is that a child’s likelihood of 
attending a religious school declines as his denomination’s share of the local population grows, 
i.e., as the strength of competing influences in public schools diminishes.  Consequently, the 
fraction of all children who attend a given denomination’s schools is a concave function of that 
denomination’s share in the population.  Additionally, under some weak regularity conditions, 
the fraction of children who attend any denomination of religious schooling is a positive function 
of both the share of the population that are adherents of any denomination and the 
denominational diversity of these adherents, as measured by a Herfindahl index.  This result 
implies that empirical researchers, at a minimum, must control for the share of the population 
that are church adherents when estimating the effects of religious pluralism on measures of 
religious activity.  
  We then use aggregate county-level data and individual survey data from the National 
Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS:88) and the Early Childhood Longitudinal 
Study-Kindergarten Cohort (ECLS-K) to test the predictions of our model.  We have four main 
substantive findings.  First, in agreement with the model’s predictions, the fraction of Catholics 
who attend Catholic schools is inversely related to the share of Catholics in the population.  A 
similar pattern holds among both Mainline and Evangelical Protestants.  These relationships are 
stronger in elementary schooling than in secondary schooling, as one might expect if the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
public schools (see, e.g., Sander and Krautmann, 1995; Evans and Schwab, 1995; Sander, 1996, 1997, 1999; and 
Jepsen, 2003). 5   
preservation of religious identity is an especially important concern for the parents of young 
children.  Second, we find evidence that the fraction of all students who attend schools of a 
specific denomination is a concave function of the market share of that denomination, 
particularly for Catholics and Evangelicals.  Third, we find that religious pluralism increases 
religious school attendance, as predicted by “rational choice” models of religious competition.  
Finally, we show that failing to control for the market share of each denomination may lead a 
researcher to mistakenly conclude that religious pluralism has a negative effect on religious 
activity.   
2.  A Model of Religious and Secular School Choice        
2.1. Market Shares and Religious Identity 
Consider an economy with a fixed population of households of measure one, with each 
household comprising one parent and one child.  Households differ in their after-tax income 
level, y, and in their religious denomination, j.  The parent of each household belongs to one of 
n+1 groups indexed by j ∈ {0,…, n}, such that  , 1 0 = ∑ = j
n
j r where rj is the fraction of the 
population that belongs to group j.  Groups 1,…, n are organized religious groups – we will refer 
to them as denominations – and group 0 includes non-religious persons.  For simplicity, we 
assume that each parent belongs to only one denomination.  We also assume that the distribution 
of after-tax income is identical in all groups, and we denote its cumulative density function by F 
and its mean by y .  
Households derive utility from a numeraire consumption good, c; from the quality of 
their children's education, x, as measured by per-pupil spending (the quantity of education is the 
same for all households); and from the probability that their children will remain in their 
denomination when becoming adults, z.  The utility function is given by  6   
(1)    . / / ) 1 ( / ) , , ( δ γ δ α δ α
δ δ δ z x c z x c U + − + =
 
Public education is available free of charge to all households at an exogenous uniform 
quality . x
3  Private schooling, both secular and religious, can be purchased from a 
competitively-priced private sector at any desired quality.
4  There are n+2 types of schools, 
where school type is indexed by s: types s = 0,…, n are private schools corresponding to the 
different groups in the population (so that s = 0 represents private non-sectarian schools and s = 
1,…, n represent denominations of religious private schools), and type s = g represents public 
schools.      
The probability that a child from denomination j' belongs to denomination j as an adult is 
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where  ) , ( j j r s e denotes the impact of the school and neighborhood environments and ω  
represents the relative impact of the home environment (  < 0  ω  < 1).  We assume that if a child 
attends religious school of type s ∈ {1,…, n} they become strongly linked to the denomination of 
that school, which insulates them from peer influences of other groups.  In this case, the 
environment effect  ) , ( j j r s e equals one for j = s and equals zero for all j ≠ s.  If a child instead 
attends a secular school (either public or private), the school has no effect on preferences for any 
specific denomination, so the environment effect equals the share of each group in the local 
                                                             
3 By holding x  and after-tax incomes fixed, we abstract from the effect of private school attendance on public 
school expenditure. 
4 This assumption neglects the fixed costs of education, which might limit quality choice in smaller communities. 
We also abstract from the possibility of privately supplementing public education. 7   
population:  j j j r r s e = ) , ( .  Formally, the effect of the school and neighborhood environments on 
the probability of belonging to each group j equals  
(3)  .
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From (2) and (3), the probability z that a religious child in group j ∈ {1,…, n} who 
attends a secular school will remain in that group equals  j r × − + ) 1 ( ω ω .  If the child instead 
attends a religious school of the household’s denomination s = j, then z = 1.  Finally, if the child 
attends a religious school of a different denomination s ≠ j, then z = ω.  Table 1 summarizes 
these probabilities, as well as the analogous transition probabilities for children from non-
religious households. 
Given the assumption that all types of private schooling are available at any desired 
quality, each household prefers sending its child to a religious school of its denomination to 
sending her to a religious school of any other denomination.  Put another way, a central 
motivation for parents to opt for religious schooling is to preserve their children’s religious 
identity.  This motivation may be quite strong, as a vast literature argues that “religious and 
ethnic traits are usually adopted in the early formative years of children’s psychology” (Bisin and 
Verdier, 2000).  It is also grounded in an extensive literature on religious choice, which shows 
that religion-specific capital formation plays a key role in determining adherence to a particular 
religious group (Greeley, 1989; Iannaccone, 1984, 1991, 1998; Chiswick, 1990; Durkin and 8   
Greeley, 1991).  Furthermore, since most religious capital is group-specific, adults generally 
adopt the religious values of the denomination to which they were exposed in their childhood 
(Iannaccone, 1990). 
As expression (3) shows, the population share of group j, rj, is positively related to the 
probability that a publicly-educated child from that group remains in the group as an adult.  
Thus, parents have a weaker motivation to incur the added expense of sending their children to 
private religious schools as their religion’s market share increases.  In the limiting case in which 
the entire population belongs to the same group, parents have no religious motivation to enroll 
their children in a religious school, regardless of the strength of their preferences.  
2.2 School choice  
2.21 School choice among secular households 
We next consider how secular households (those in group j = 0) choose between public, 
private secular, and private religious schooling to maximize their utility.  A household i that 
chooses public education receives free schooling of qualityx .  Therefore, it spends all its after-
tax income on consumption, so that  i i y c = .  Equation (1) then implies that the utility of a 
secular household whose child attends public school equals  
(4)  V0g (x , r0, ω, y) = αy
 δ/δ  + (1 − α) x
δ/δ  + γ [ω + (1−ω) r0]
δ/δ .   
Given the assumption that private non-religious schooling is available at any desired quality, a 
non-religious household will always prefer a secular private school to a religious one. Denoting 
by p the cost per student of a unit of quality, a non-religious household that sends its child to a 
secular private school solves 
 
 Maxc,x U(c, x) = αc
δ/δ  +  (1− α)x
δ/δ   + 
 γ 
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 s.t.   c + px  =  y 
 
and has indirect utility 
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Because opting out from public to secular private education does not change the 
probability that a child remains in the household’s religious group, the only motivation for doing 
so is to obtain a higher quality of education. Therefore, as education quality is a normal good, the 
non-religious households that opt out of public schooling will be those with higher incomes.  A 
comparison of (4) and (5) shows that for a given public education quality  x , either all non-
religious households prefer public education, or there exists a threshold income level  
 




















p g , such that all non-religious households with incomes below y0 
send their children to public schools and all those with incomes above y0 send their children to 
secular private schools. The share of non-religious households whose children attend secular 
private schools is then  10   
  
(8)  θ0
 = 1 – F (y0 ( x )).  
2.2.2 School choice among religious households
 
 
As in the derivation of (5) above, it is straightforward to show that a religious household 
whose child attends public school has indirect utility 
 (9)  Vjg(x , r, ω, y) = αy
δ/δ  + (1 − α) x
δ/δ  + γ [ω + (1− ω) rj]
δ/δ .              
As noted above, a household of group j will always prefer a religious private school of its 
denomination to any other private school.  A household of group j that sends its child to a 
religious private school of its denomination solves   
 Maxc,x U(c, x) = αc
δ/δ  +  (1− α)x
δ/δ  + 
 γ /δ
    
 
s.t.   c + px = y 
and has indirect utility 
(10)  Vjj(y) = g0 (α, p, δ)y
 δ/δ  + 
 γ /δ ,                                                           
with g0 defined as above in (6).  Comparing (9) and (10), we find that for a given level of public 
school quality, either all households of group j prefer public education, or there exists a threshold 
income level  

















x y    
such that all households of group j with incomes below yj send their children to public school, 
and all those with incomes above yj send their children to their denominational school. Thus, the 
share of households from group j who send their children to their denominational schools is 
(12)  θj
 = 1 − F(yj ( x , rj, ω)).                                                         
As we show in Proposition 1, θj is a decreasing function of the size of group j in the population.  11   
Proposition 1. The share of households from group j whose children attend religious schools, θj, 
decreases with the share of group j in the local population, rj. 
Proof. 
 
θj is given by (12) above, so that    
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.    
    Q.E.D.            
Proposition 1 shows that as the share of group j in the population grows, outside 
influences from competing religions become less threatening, weakening parents’ religious 
motivation for sending their children to their denominational schools.  Consequently, a lower 
percentage of households from group j will opt to enroll their children in these schools.  
Next, define the share of all children in the population that attend private religious 
schooling of type s = j as qj, where  
(13)  j q  =  ) ( j j j r r θ ×  .                                                                   
The market share of group j has two opposite effects on qj.  First, rj directly and linearly 
increases qj, so for a given share of parents from group j who send their children to religious 12   
schooling, θj, there is a linear relationship between qj and the share of group j in the population.  
On the other hand, Proposition 1 showed that θj decreases with rj.  As Proposition 2 shows, under 
the assumption that the elasticity of  j j j r r ∂ ∂ / ) ( θ with respect to rj is greater than -2, these 
competing effects imply a concave effect of rj on qj.    
Proposition 2. If the elasticity of  j j j r r ∂ ∂ / ) ( θ with respect to rj is greater than -2, then the 
enrollment rate in denominational schools of type s = j, qj, is a concave function of the size of 
group j in the population. 
 
Proof. 
From (13),  2
2
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is negative if and only if σθr > -2.   
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 is finite as rj approaches zero, as is evident based on Proposition 


















 < 0, qj is a concave function of rj.
 5 
                                                             
5 The technical assumption that the elasticity of  j j j r r ∂ ∂ / ) ( θ with respect to rj is greater than -2 is very likely to 
hold in practice.  For example, it holds for every  ) ( j j r θ that is linear, i.e.,  j j r a a 1 0 − = θ  (with  0 1 > a ), which 
implies that
2
1 0 j j j r a r a q − = .  In this case, it is straightforward to show that  0 2 / 1
2 2 < − = ∂ ∂ a r q j j , so that  j q  13   
Q.E.D. 
Finally, we consider the implications of our model for the relationship between religious 
pluralism and the overall enrollment rate into religious schools.  Assume that  ) ( j j r θ  can be 
written as a linear function of rj:  
(14)  . ) ( 1 0 j j j j j r a a r − = θ                                       
Proposition 1 implies that a1j is positive, with the subscript j reflecting that denominations may 
vary in their response to increased competition from other denominations.  Similarly, qj  is a 
quadratic function of rj: 
(15) 
2
1 0 1 0 ) ( ) ( j j j j j j j j j j j j r a r a r a a r r r q − = − × = × = θ .                                     
 
Aggregating (15) across all denominations, the total religious enrollment rate Q is given by 





j j j j
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Therefore, in the general case in which  j a0 and  j a1 vary across denomination, the 
religious enrollment rate is a quadratic function of the market share of each denomination.  The 
religious enrollment rate can be interpreted as a function of the weighted market shares in the 
population and the weighted Herfindahl index, where  j a0 and  j a1 are the weights.
6  On the other 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
is concave (i.e., Proposition 2 holds).  Alternatively, suppose that 
α θ
− = j j j r r ) ( (with  0 > α ).  In this case, α  
must be  1 <  in order for  0 / lim 0 ≥ ∂ ∂ → j j r r q
j  to hold.  For every
  1 0 < < α , 
( )
( ) 0 1 /
1 2 2 < − − = ∂ ∂
+ − α α α j j j r r q , so Proposition 2 again holds. 
6 Iannaccone (1991) used a specification similar to (16) to investigate the effects of religious pluralism on religious 
attendance among Protestants.  However, subsequent studies have used more restrictive specifications similar to that 
given by (17) below.  Our behavioral model of school choice implies that Iannaccone’s specification, rather than the 
more restrictive version, is more appropriate for studying the association between pluralism and participation.  
Additionally, in the empirical study we undertake below, we strongly reject the restricted specifications in favor of 
the general one given by (16).   14   
hand, if and only if  j a0 and  j a1 are identical among all religious groups, expression (16) 











j j j r a r a Q                                                                              
In this case, the total religious enrollment rate is a function of the share of the population that 













2 .  This insight implies that one should first estimate the more general 
equation, given by (16), and test the hypothesis that the parameters  j a0 and  j a1 are identical for 
all denominations.  Only if this hypothesis is true can one justify estimating the religious 













2 .  Moreover, even if  j a0  and  j a1 are both constant across 
denominations, one should control for the religiosity rate when assessing the effect of pluralism 
on religious activity.  Analyses that instead exclude the religiosity rate will generate biased 
estimates of the effects of pluralism on religious activity because of the mechanical relationship 
between the 
2
j r and the (omitted)  j r terms in (17). 
3.  Data 
We use both county-level data and individual survey data from NELS:88 and ECLS-K in 
the empirical analyses below.  We note at the outset that the central models are those based on 
the county-level data, which includes all students rather than a small subset of students in each 15   
county.  While the individual-level survey data includes individual-level controls, this advantage 
is quite limited in this context because the key explanatory variables vary at the county level.   
3.1 County-level data 
We combine data from several sources.  County-level data on elementary and secondary 
enrollment by school type were created using school-level measures from the Private School 
Survey of 1999-2000.  For each school, this survey reports enrollment by grade, which permits 
distinguishing between elementary (K-8) and secondary enrollment (9-12).  The survey also 
includes whether each private school is religious and, if so, to which denomination it belongs.  It 
identifies twenty-eight types of religious schools, which we aggregated into four broader 
categories: Catholic, Mainline Protestants, Evangelical Protestants and Other Religions.
7  
We supplemented these enrollment data with data on elementary and secondary 
enrollment in public schooling taken from the Public Elementary / Secondary School Universe 
Survey available at http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pubschuniv.asp.  These enrollment data allow us to 
calculate the enrollment rate of each sector of private schooling.  In order to control for the 
supply of each type of schooling, we used the Private School Survey of 1989-1990 (ten years 
prior to the period of the analysis) and constructed the density of each type of schooling by 
dividing the number of schools of each type in the county by the area of the county in 1990.    
  County data on the share of each denomination in the population were taken from Jones 
et al. (2002), which provides county data for the year 2000 on the market shares of each of 149 
denominations.  We aggregated these shares to the four broader categories mentioned above – 
                                                             
7 The categories and the denominations included in each are as follows: Catholic, Mainline Protestant (Calvinist, 
Disciples of Christ, Episcopal, Friends, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Methodist, Presbyterian), 
Evangelical Protestant (African Methodist Episcopal, Amish, Assembly of God, Baptist, Brethren, Christian (no 
specific denomination), Church of Christ, Church of God, Church of God in Christ, Lutheran Church – Missouri 
Synod, Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Other Lutheran, Mennonite, Pentecostal, Seventh-Day Adventists), 
and Other Religion (Greek Orthodox, Islamic, Jewish, Latter-Day Saint, and all others not listed above).     16   
Catholics, Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants and Other religions – according to an 
aggregation scheme recommended by Jones et al. (2002).  Finally, we combined these data with 
demographic variables taken from the County and City Data Book 2000, available at 
www.census.gov.  County data on the share of the population that lives in a rural area were taken 
from the STF3 files of the 2000 U.S. Census.   
Table 2 presents summary statistics for all county-level variables used in the analyses 
below.  We weight each observation by the county’s population to produce weighted summary 
statistics.  The average Catholic, Evangelical, Mainline, and “Other Religions” market shares 
were 22.04 percent, 14.19 percent, 9.64 percent, and 4.35 percent, respectively.  Similarly, the 
Catholic school enrollment rate was 4.81 percent, the Evangelical enrollment rate was 2.66 
percent, the Mainline enrollment rate was 0.47 percent, and the non-sectarian private enrollment 
rate was 1.56 percent.  
3.2 NELS:88 and ECLS-K 
NELS:88 is a nationally representative sample of eighth graders that was initially 
conducted in 1988 by the US National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).  This survey 
included 24,599 students from 1032 schools, with subsamples of these respondents resurveyed in 
1990, 1992, 1994, and 2000 follow-ups.  The survey provides information on household and 
individual backgrounds and on attendance at a Catholic school or a non-Catholic religious school 
(NCES aggregates all non-Catholic religious schools into an “other religious school” category).  
For all students included in the base-year sample, NELS:88 includes detailed Census zip code-
level information on their eighth grade school, which allows for identification of the zip code in 
which the school is located; we treat this as the zip code of the student’s home. This allows for a 
merging with the county-level data described above, such as county measures of the shares of the 17   
population who are Catholic, Mainline Protestant, and Evangelical.  Table 3 presents summary 
statistics from the NELS:88 data. 
We also analyze the base year of the ECLS-K survey, which includes 18,644 
kindergarteners from over 1000 schools in the fall of the 1998–1999 school year. As in 
NELS:88, the base year survey includes information on the school’s zip code, which permits 
merging of these data with information on the within-county religious distribution of the 
population and the other county-level variables described above.  Table 4 presents summary 
statistics from the ECLS-K data.  
4.  Empirical Results 
4.1 Specifications Based on County-level data 
We first test Proposition 1, which states that share of households from group j whose 
children attend religious schools, θj, is decreasing in the share of group j in the local population, 
rj.  As the county-level data do not allow us to identify which individuals belong to each 
religious group, we use the ratio of denomination enrollment to denomination membership as a 
proxy for θj.
8  One possible approach to testing Proposition 1 would involve regressing this 
proxy for θj on rj and then testing whether the regression slope coefficient is negative.  For 
example, one could regress the ratio of Catholic enrollment to Catholic membership on the 
Catholic share in the local population, including a set of relevant demographic controls.  These 
controls should include state fixed effects in order to control for state-specific factors that may 
                                                             
8 For example, the ratio of Catholic school enrollment to Catholic membership is equal to the share of Catholic 
households that sends their children to Catholic schools under the assumption that no non-Catholic households send 
their children to Catholic schools.  This assumption holds approximately, but not strictly, in practice.  Altonji et al. 
(2005) estimate that fewer than 0.3 percent of non-Catholic households in NELS:88 send their children to Catholic 
schools. 18   
influence the demand for a particular type of schooling.  Using this approach, one would 
estimate the following equations, separately for each denomination j:  
 (18)   , /
'
1 0 jcs s cs jcs jcs jcs X r a a members enroll ε γ β + + + + =      
where enrolljcs refers to the number of students in county c in state s that are enrolled in school 
type j, membersjcs refers to the number of members of denomination j in that county, rjcs is 
defined as above as the fraction of the population that belongs to denomination j, Xcs refers to 
observed demographic controls in county c of state s, and γs denotes state fixed effects.  
A potential problem with direct estimation of (18) stems from the fact that 
denominational membership appears both in the denominator of the dependent variable and in 
the numerator of rjcs, the key regressor.  Because membership is likely measured with error, OLS 
estimation of (18) will typically produce biased estimates of a1.  A solution to this problem 
involves simply multiplying both sides of the equation by membersjcs, yielding a regression of 
enrolljcs on each right-hand side variable (including the constant term) multiplied by membersjcs.  
We can therefore test Proposition 1 by estimating the following specification: 
 (19)   
,




jcs cs jcs jcs jcs jcs
members




× + × + =
     
where
 
jcs jcs jcs members × = ε η .  We weight each observation by the county’s population, based 
on the 2000 U.S. Census, and estimate (19) via weighted least squares.
 9   
Table 5 presents estimates of a1 from specification (19), with the upper panel of the table 
showing results for Catholic school enrollment.  The first two columns show results for 
elementary schooling (grades K-8), the next two columns show results for secondary schooling 
                                                             
9 Our results are insensitive to instead using unweighted OLS models, as well as to using weighted Tobit models 
that explicitly account for the fact that enrolljcs is bounded below by zero.  Results from these alternative 
specifications are available upon request.  19   
(grades 9-12), and the last two columns show results for combined K-12 enrollment.  For each of 
these grade spans we use two different specifications.  The first does not include any controls 
while the second includes all of the demographic controls described above, including a measure 
of the density of Catholic schools in 1990, which is intended to capture supply-side capacity 
effects.  Specifically, Catholic school enrollment levels may be constrained by the number of 
Catholic schools operating within a county, and including this measure is a straightforward way 
of controlling for these possible effects.
10   
As the top panel of the table shows, the estimates of a1 are negative in all six 
specifications.  Including demographic controls slightly increases (in absolute value) the 
magnitudes of the estimates in all cases.  In general, the estimates are much more negative for 
elementary schooling than for secondary schooling.  As noted above, this pattern is as expected 
because the motive to preserve religious identity is presumably a stronger factor in elementary 
school choice than in secondary school choice.  
The middle panel of the table shows the results for enrollment into Evangelical schools.  
The estimates of a1 are larger (in absolute value) than those for Catholic enrollment in all six 
cases, and five of the six estimates are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The 
estimates are again much larger for elementary schooling than for secondary schooling.  The 
bottom panel reports the results for enrollment into Mainline Protestant schools.  The estimates 
of a1 are negative in five out of the six columns, and they are significant at the five percent level 
in four cases. The only exceptions are the coefficient for secondary schooling in the regression 
without controls, which is positive and insignificant, and the coefficient for elementary schooling 
in the regression with controls, which is negative and nearly significant at the ten percent level. 
                                                             
10 We also estimated alternative specifications in which we include all of the demographic variables except for the 
density of Catholic schools. We found that controlling for the supply of Catholic schools in 1990 has essentially no 
effect on the estimates in all cases.  20   
In sum, the findings are supportive of Proposition 1, as 17 of the 18 estimates in the table are 
negative, with 11 significantly so.
11  
We next turn to tests of Proposition 2, which implies that the share of all students that 
enrolls in schools of denomination j, qj, is a concave function of the market share of that 
denomination in the local population.  To test this proposition, we estimate the following models, 
again separately for each denomination j: 
(20)   .
' 2
2 1 0 jcs cs jcs jcs jcs X r b r b b q ε γ + + + + =      
Table 6 presents estimates of b1 and b2 for all three denominations, with the upper panel 
of the table showing results for Catholic school enrollment.  In each specification, the Catholic 
market share has a strong concave effect on the Catholic enrollment rate.  The estimates of b1 are 
positive and significant (at the five percent level) in all six cases, while the estimates of b2 are 
negative and significant in all cases.  The middle panel of the table presents analogous results for 
Evangelicals.  Again, the Evangelical market share has a significant concave effect on the 
Evangelical enrollment rate in all six columns.  Finally, the bottom panel presents estimates for 
Mainline Protestants.  In contrast to the results described above, we do not find evidence that 
enrollment into Mainline schools is a function (either linear or quadratic) of the Mainline market 
                                                             
11 In Appendix Table 1, we present estimates based on another approach to testing Proposition 1, derived from a 
logarithmic version of (18): 
[ ] [ ] . ) ln( / ln / ln
'
1 0 jcs s cs cs jcs jcs jcs X pop members b b members enroll ε γ β + + + + =   
This log-log approach allows for an easy solution to the problem of measurement error in membersjcs because this 
equation can be rewritten as   
  ( ) . ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 1 ) ln(
'
1 1 0 jcs s cs cs jcs jcs X pop b members b b enroll ε γ β + + + − × + + =  
Proposition 1 implies that b1 is negative, so that the coefficient on ln(membersjcs) is less than 1 (so that a 1-percent 
increase in denominational membership causes a less than 1-percent increase in denominational enrollment).  The 
estimates strongly support Proposition 1 for all three denominations; specifically, the estimates of (b1 + 1) are 
significantly less than 1 in 17 of the 18 cases. 
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share.  This null finding may stem from the fact that Mainline enrollment rates are uniformly 
low.  Note that the adjusted r
2 values in all of the models in the bottom panel of Table 6 are 
substantially lower than those shown in the middle and upper panels, implying that Mainline 
enrollment rates are less responsive to all of our demographic controls (not just the 
denominational shares) than are Catholic and Evangelical enrollment rates.  
We turn next to tests of the final prediction of our model, which relates the overall 
demand for religious schooling to quadratic functions of the market shares of each denomination.  
The unrestricted version of this model is  




2 1 0 jcs cs
n
j
jcs j jcs j cs X r c r c c Q ε δ + + + + = ∑
=      
where  cs Q represents the overall enrollment rate into religious schools.  As noted above, several 
previous researchers have estimated restricted versions of this model, such as a version that 













jcs cs X r c r c c Q ε δ + + + + = ∑ ∑
= =     
Yet another version, common in the literature on the effects of religious pluralism on religious 





2 0 jcs cs
n
j
jcs cs X r c c Q ε δ + + + = ∑
=     
Table 7 presents estimates of models (21)-(23) for elementary schooling.  The first 
column shows estimates of the c1j and c2j coefficients from specification (21).  The estimates 
imply that the overall enrollment rate into religious elementary schools is a concave function of 
the Catholic and Evangelical market shares but not a concave function of the market share of 
Mainline Protestants.  The bottom two rows of the table, labeled “Test 1” and “Test 2”, present 22   
p-values of the hypotheses that the c1j and c2j coefficients, respectively, do not vary across 
denominations.  Both tests are rejected at the 5 percent level.   
Column (2) presents estimates from a specification in which all c2j terms are restricted to 
be equal, and column (3) additionally restricts all c1j terms to be equal, representing specification 
(22) above.  In these columns, the linear market shares (or, alternatively, their sum) positively 
affect the religious enrollment rate.  Likewise, the negative and significant coefficient on the 
Herfindahl index implies that religious pluralism also increases the religious enrollment rate.
12  
However, the estimate in column (4) shows the consequences of failing to control for the market 
shares of each denomination.  In this case, the positive coefficient on the Herfindahl index 
incorrectly implies that religious pluralism decreases the demand for religious schooling.  More 
generally, this example illustrates that excluding the market share terms rj from models relating 
religious pluralism to religious activity may produce misleading results – the omission of the rj 
terms induces omitted variables bias because of the correlation between rj and rj
2. 
Table 8 presents the estimates from models (21)-(23) for secondary schooling.  The 
results are very similar to those in Table 7.  Specifically, the market shares have concave effects 
on the demand for religious schooling among Catholics, Evangelicals and the “Other religions” 
category.  Columns (2) and (3) show that the overall religious enrollment rate is positively 
associated with both the linear market shares and religious pluralism (as implied by the negative 
coefficient on the Herfindahl index).  As was the case in Table 7, column (4) again shows that 
failing to control for the linear market shares yields estimates that incorrectly imply that 
pluralism decreases religious enrollment. 
                                                             








2 varies from a minimum of 1/n, in which all religions’ market shares are equal, to a 
maximum of 1, in which all adherents practice only one religion.  As such, the index is increasing in religious 
concentration and decreasing in religious pluralism. 23   
4.2 Specifications Based on Individual-level data 
We next turn to using individual data from NELS:88 and ECLS-K to test the implications 
of the model.  The ECLS-K does not include measures of a household’s religion, making it 
impossible to assess Proposition 1.  We therefore proceed with testing Proposition 2, that the 
share of all students that enrolls in schools of denomination j is a concave function of that 
denomination’s market share.  We use the individual analog of expression (20): 




2 1 0 ijcs ics
n
j
jcs j jcs j i X r c r c c j d ε δ + + + + = = ∑
=     
where  } ,..., 0 { n di ∈  measures the denomination of the school in which student i is enrolled.  Xics 
includes both county-level demographics and the individual control variables listed in Tables 3 
and 4.  Catholic schools are the only religious schools identified in NELS:88 and ECLS-K, so in 
practice (24) is a binary model of Catholic school attendance.  We estimate this model by linear 
probability, although the substantive results are unaffected if we instead use probit or logit 
models. 
Table 9 presents the estimates of c1j and c2j.  For all grade levels and specifications, the 
Catholic market share has a significant concave effect on Catholic school attendance.  Focusing 
on our preferred specifications in columns (2), (4), and (6), these effects again appear to be 
slightly stronger in early grades than in high school, reflecting that the preservation of religious 
identity is strongest in early grades. 
Finally, Table 10 presents estimates of the individual-level analogs of expressions (21)-
(23) in order to assess whether overall religious school attendance rates are a concave function of 
each of the religious market shares.  Again, the estimates largely agree with those based on the 
county-level data.  Column (1) indicates that all four market shares have a concave effect on the 
probability of attending a religious kindergarten.  Similar results are obtained for eighth grade 24   
attendance (column (5)) and for high school attendance (column (9)).  However, restricted 
models that impose equality of the c2j coefficients imply that pluralism decreases the probability 
of attending religious schooling in eight of the nine cases (see the coefficients on the Herfindahl 
index in columns (2)-(4), (6)-(8), and (10)-(12)), although the estimate is significantly different 
from zero in only one instance.  
In sum, the results based on the individual-level data generally agree with those based on 
county-level data.  The local Catholic market share has a significant concave effect on Catholic 
school attendance, and estimates of the effect of religious pluralism on religious school 
attendance are sensitive to the choice of specification.  We emphasize, however, that the 
individual-level data include only a small subset of counties within the U.S. and a small subset of 
students within each county.  As a result, the estimates based on these data are typically 
imprecise; note that the standard errors in Table 10 are roughly five to ten times larger than those 
shown in Tables 7 and 8.  We therefore view the estimates based on county-level data as our 
preferred results. 
5.  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
We develop a model of school choice that incorporates religious parents’ desires for their 
children to maintain their religious identities into adulthood.  We posit that religious parents 
enroll their children in religious schools in order to shield their children from exposure to other 
religions (and to secularism), based on the idea that the principal threats to the preservation of a 
child’s religious beliefs stem from these competing influences.  The behavioral model generates 
two primary implications.  First, the proportion of children in a given denomination who attend 
religious schools declines as that denomination becomes more prevalent in the population.  The 
negative association between enrollment rates and market shares arises because the threat of 25   
outside influences in non-religious schools declines as the denomination’s market share increases 
– in the limiting case in which the entire population belongs to the same denomination, parents 
have no motivation to enroll their children in a religious school.  Second, a given denomination’s 
market share has a concave effect on overall attendance rates in that denomination’s schools, due 
to two competing factors.  On one hand, an increase in the market share increases the fraction of 
children attending that denomination’s schools, holding the within-denomination attendance rate 
constant.  On the other hand, the within-denomination attendance rate declines due to the 
aforementioned weakening of the motivation to attend religious schools. 
Using county-level data from the U.S., supplemented with individual-level data from 
ECLS-K and NELS:88, we find support for the model’s implications.  Among Catholics and 
both Mainline and Evangelical Protestants, the within-denomination rate of religious school 
attendance is strongly negatively related to denominational market shares.  Moreover, overall 
attendance rates at Catholic and Evangelical schools are concave functions of the Catholic and 
Evangelical market shares, respectively.  These findings support the notion that parents’ wishes 
to preserve their children’s religious identities play a fundamental role in the demand for private 
religious education. 
Finally, this study is the first to provide a theoretical underpinning for empirical studies 
of the links between religious activity and religious pluralism.  We show that a commonly used 
empirical specification, in which religious activity is modeled as a function of a Herfindahl 
index-based measure of religious pluralism, is a restricted version of the more general 
specification implied by our behavioral model.  Failing to include religious market shares in such 
empirical models can severely bias estimates of the effect of pluralism on religious activity.  
These findings provide important guidance for future empirical research on the effects of 
religious pluralism on a variety of measures of religious activity.  26   
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Table 1. The Probability That a Child Shares His Parent’s Religious Orientation  
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of County-Level Variables 
  
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Percent Hispanic in county  3139  12.55  15.07 
Median income  3139  39324.51  9419.75 
Average number of people per household  3139  2.61  0.23 
Percent of population at school age (5 to 17)  3139  18.88  2.14 
Percent African-Americans in county  3139  12.32  13.19 
Percent of population living in rural areas  3138  21.15  25.63 
Population density  3139  2.12  6.59 
Pupils per teacher ratio  3127  15.75  4.97 
Percent Catholics in county  3138  22.04  15.15 
Catholic schools per square mile  3139  0.10  0.33 
Catholic members (in thousands)  3138  330.46  737.22 
Catholic enrollment/Total enrollment × 100  3120  4.81  4.75 
Catholic enrollment/Catholic members × 100  2985  4.26  5.32 
Percent Evangelical Protestants in county  3139  14.19  12.64 
Total enrollment in Evangelical schools  3139  5175.14  10366.09 
Evangelical schools per square mile  3139  0.04  0.06 
Evangelical protestant members (in thousands)  3138  87.47  140.51 
Evangelical enrollment/Total enrollment × 100  3120  2.66  2.36 
Evangelical enrollment/Evangelical members × 100  3111  5.22  4.20 
Percent Mainline Protestants in county  3138  9.65  6.47 
Total enrollment in Mainline schools  3139  1062.95  2079.14 
Mainline schools per square mile  3139  0.01  0.03 
Mainline protestant members (in thousands)  3138  63.69  86.29 
Mainline enrollment/Total enrollment × 100  3120  0.47  1.17 
Mainline enrollment/Mainline members × 100  3119  1.29  4.88 
Non-sectarian private enrollment / Total enrollment × 100  3120  1.56  1.96 
Percent Other religions in county  3139  4.35  7.27 
Herfindahl index  3139  -12.83  9.23 
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                         Table 3. Summary Statistics in NELS:88 (N=13,710) 
   
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Catholic High School Attendance  0.054  0.226 
Catholic 8th Grade Attendance  0.083  0.276 
Parents Reported Catholic Religion  0.340  1.727 
Catholic Schools / Sq. Mile in County  0.055  0.162 
Percent Catholic in County Population  0.230  0.197 
Percent Catholic in County Population in 1890  0.097  0.095 
Female  0.508  0.500 
Asian  0.054  0.226 
Hispanic  0.122  0.327 
Black  0.099  0.299 
HH composition     
Both Parents in HH  0.701  0.458 
Mother + another adult  0.105  0.306 
Father + another adult  0.021  0.142 
Mother only   0.143  0.350 
Father only   0.023  0.151 
HH composition missing  0.008  0.090 
Parents' Marital Status     
Married  0.781  0.413 
Divorced  0.108  0.311 
Widowed  0.025  0.155 
Separated  0.032  0.176 
Never Married  0.022  0.146 
Marriage-Like Long-term Relationship  0.016  0.127 
Marital Status missing  0.015  0.123 
Father's Education  12.455  4.184 
Mother's Education  12.913  2.640 
Log(Family Income)  9.814  2.136 
County Percent Rural  26.222  27.036 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics in ECLS-K (N=10,549) 
   
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Catholic Kindergarten Attendance  0.128  0.334 
Parents Reported Catholic Religion  N/A  N/A 
Catholic Schools / Sq. Mile in County  0.053  0.129 
Percent Catholic in County Population  0.218  0.173 
Female  0.492  0.500 
Asian  0.055  0.227 
Hispanic  0.169  0.375 
Black  0.146  0.353 
HH composition     
Both Parents in HH  0.711  0.453 
Mother + another adult  0.069  0.254 
Father + another adult  0.007  0.082 
Mother only   0.190  0.392 
Father only   0.015  0.122 
HH composition missing  0.008  0.090 
Parents' Marital Status     
Married  0.669  0.471 
Divorced  0.084  0.278 
Widowed  0.009  0.093 
Separated  0.045  0.206 
Never Married  0.141  0.348 
Marriage-Like Long-term Relationship     
Marital Status missing  0.053  0.224 
Father's Education  12.737  3.881 
Mother's Education  12.988  3.100 
Log(Family Income)  10.506  0.986 
County Percent Rural  28.386  31.115 
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Table 5. Tests of Proposition 1: Denomination-Specific Enrollment Rates into 
Religious Schools 
Variables  
Elementary  Secondary  Overall 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Catholic school enrollment 
% Catholic × Catholic 
members  
-0.185  -0.276*  -0.059  -0.085  -0.243  -0.352* 
(0.161)  (0.121)  (0.061)  (0.069)  (0.217)  (0.167) 
Demographic 
controls × Catholic 
members  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.837  0.996  0.85  0.992  0.843  0.996 
Evangelical school enrollment 
% Evangelical × 
Evangelical members 
-2.802*  -0.729*  -0.409*  -0.093  -3.211*  -0.804* 
(0.491)  (0.137)  (0.093)  (0.056)  (0.581)  (0.181) 
Demographic 
controls × 
Evangelical members  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.939  0.996  0.913  0.989  0.939  0.996 
Mainline school enrollment 
% Mainline × 
Mainline members 
-1.258*  -0.365  0.122  -0.339*  -1.135*  -0.692* 
(0.338)  (0.223)  (0.106)  (0.114)  (0.251)  (0.315) 
Demographic 
controls × Mainline 
members  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.82  0.945  0.269  0.701  0.785  0.912 
Observations  3,138  3,126  3,138  3,126  3,138  3,126 
Notes: 
1) Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to clustering at the state level. 
2) Demographic controls include median income, density of population, percent of 
population at school-age, percent African–Americans in the population, percent Hispanics in 
the population, population, percent of population that lives in a rural area, average number 
of people per household and pupil to teacher ratio, as well as their square terms. In addition 
we also include state fixed effects and the market share of other denominations. 
3) Estimates marked with “*” are significantly different from zero at the five percent level. 
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Table 6. Tests of Proposition 2: Enrollment Rates into Religious Schools as a Quadratic 
Function of Denomination Market Share 
Variables  
Elementary  Secondary  Overall 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Catholic school enrollment 
% Catholic  0.298*  0.342*  0.287*  0.137*  0.294*  0.310* 
(0.072)  (0.053)  (0.057)  (0.028)  (0.067)  (0.046) 
% Catholic squared / 
100  -0.218*  -0.230*  -0.216*  -0.078*  -0.216*  -0.211* 
(0.109)  (0.072)  (0.087)  (0.032)  (0.100)  (0.062) 
Demographic controls  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.345  0.770  0.281  0.368  0.349  0.782 
Evangelical school enrollment 
% Evangelical  0.190*  0.238*  0.140*  0.126*  0.176*  0.205* 
(0.034)  (0.052)  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.041) 
% Evangelical squared / 
100  -0.330*  -0.325*  -0.221*  -0.189*  -0.299*  -0.285* 
(0.055)  (0.069)  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.046)  (0.056) 
Demographic controls  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.097  0.329  0.079  0.256  0.100  0.327 
Mainline school enrollment 
% Mainline  0.004  0.019  0.025  0.009  0.01  0.018 
(0.018)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.019) 
% Mainline squared / 
100  -0.008  0.011   -0.037  0.020   -0.017  0.012  
(0.046)  (0.044)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.047)  (0.046) 
Demographic controls  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.000  0.206  0.004  0.205  0.001  0.200 
Observations  3,120  3,119  3,107  3,106  3,120  3,119 
Notes: 
1) Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to clustering at the state level. 
2) Demographic controls include median income, density of population, percent of population 
at school-age, percent African–Americans in the population, percent Hispanics in the 
population, population, percent of population that lives in a rural area, average number of 
people per household and pupil to teacher ratio, as well as their square terms. In addition we 
also include state fixed effects and the market share of other denominations. 
3) Estimates marked with “*” are significantly different from zero at the five percent level. 
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Table 7. Overall Enrollment Rates in Religious Elementary Schools as a 
Quadratic Function of Religious Market Shares 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
% Catholic  0.354*  0.332* 
(0.063)  (0.045) 
% Catholic squared / 100  -0.251* 
(0.088) 
% Evangelical  0.307*  0.181* 
(0.084)  (0.053) 
% Evangelical squared / 100  -0.421* 
(0.104) 
% Mainline  -0.040  0.088* 
(0.058)  (0.031) 
% Mainline squared / 100  0.042 
(0.096) 
% Other  0.104  0.201* 
(0.062)  (0.068) 
% Other squared / 100  -0.045 
(0.057) 
Sum of Religions  0.199* 
(0.041) 
Herfindahl Index / 100  -0.228*  -0.159*  0.085* 
(0.053)  (0.055)  (0.026) 
Demographic controls?  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.649  0.644  0.616  0.598 
Observations  3,119  3,119  3,119  3,119 
Test 1  0.001 
Test 2  0.005 
Notes: 
1) Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to clustering at the state level. 
2) Demographic controls are identical to those listed in Tables 5 and 6. 
3) Estimates marked with “*” are significantly different from zero at the five percent 
level. 
4) For the two F tests, the value reported is the relevant p-value.  In “Test 1”, the null 
hypothesis is that the coefficients on all market shares are equal.  In “Test 2”, the null 
hypothesis is that the coefficients on all squared market shares are equal. 
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Table 8. Overall Enrollment Rates in Religious Secondary Schools as a 
Quadratic Function of Religious Market Shares 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
% Catholic  0.218*  0.212* 
(0.035)  (0.024) 
% Catholic squared / 100  -0.135* 
(0.045) 
% Evangelical  0.124  0.090* 
(0.065)  (0.037) 
% Evangelical squared / 100  -0.177* 
(0.084) 
% Mainline  -0.132*  -0.028 
(0.056)  (0.031) 
% Mainline squared / 100  0.109 
(0.092) 
% Other  0.156*  0.134* 
(0.080)  (0.051) 
% Other squared / 100  -0.171 
(0.103) 
Sum of Religions  0.086* 
(0.029) 
Herfindahl Index / 100  -0.127*  -0.045  0.061* 
(0.033)  (0.040)  (0.021) 
Demographic controls?  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.599  0.598  0.575  0.571 
Observations  3,106  3,106  3,106  3,106 
Test 1  0.000 
Test 2  0.070 
Notes: 
1) Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to clustering at the state level. 
2) Demographic controls are identical to those listed in Tables 5 and 6. 
3) Estimates marked with “*” are significantly different from zero at the five percent 
level. 
4) For the two F tests, the value reported is the relevant p-value.  In “Test 1”, the null 
hypothesis is that the coefficients on all market shares are equal.  In “Test 2”, the null 
hypothesis is that the coefficients on all squared market shares are equal. 
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Table 9. Test of Proposition 2: Catholic School Enrollment as a Quadratic Function of 
Catholic Market Shares, NELS:88 and ECLS-K 
                  Kindergarten  Eighth Grade  High School 
Variable  (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6) 
% Catholic   0.532  0.605  0.987  0.614  0.827  0.322 
   (0.184)  (0.180)  (0.140)  (0.127)  (0.088)  (0.083) 
% Catholic squared/100  -0.657  -0.770  -0.756  -0.665  -0.722  -0.302 
(0.292)  (0.298)  (0.164)  (0.171)  (0.089)  (0.113) 
Demographic Controls?  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Notes: 
1) Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to clustering at the county level. 
2)  N = 15,205 in the “High School” and “Eighth Grade” specifications involving NELS:88, and N = 
10,549 in the “Kindergarten” specifications involving ECLS-K. 
3) Estimates marked with “*” are significantly different from zero at the five percent 
level. 
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
% Catholic 0.716* 0.427* 0.626* 0.064 0.374* -0.058
(0.287) (0.191) (0.201) (0.136) (0.171) (0.100)
% Catholic squared / 100 -0.804 -0.696* -0.412*
(0.428) (0.214) (0.181)
% Evangelical 0.160 0.017 0.245 0.323 0.295 -0.226
(0.414) (0.234) (0.388) (0.206) (0.332) (0.173)
% Evangelical squared / 100 -0.152 -0.376 -0.458
(0.616) (0.559) (0.479)
% Mainline 1.067* 0.397 1.077* 0.067 0.660 -0.127
(0.501) (0.241) (0.381) (0.180) (0.321) (0.156)
% Mainline squared / 100 -1.978 -2.343* -1.506*
(1.015) (0.830) (0.641)
% Other 0.812 0.420 0.620 0.029 0.716 0.001
(0.705) (0.305) (0.595) (0.338) (0.500) (0.282)
% Other squared / 100 -1.205 -0.712 -0.870
(1.113) (0.699) (0.590)
Sum of Religions -0.319 -0.181 -0.124
(0.111) (0.113) (0.096)
Herfindahl Index / 100 -0.318 0.390* 0.073 0.161 0.132 0.058 0.294 0.129 0.146
(0.318) (0.168) (0.089) (0.272) (0.153) (0.080) (0.320) (0.231) (0.125)
Demographic controls? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Test 1 0.053 0.107 0.103
Test 2 0.115 0.127 0.139
Table 10. Overall Religious Enrollment Rates as a Quadratic Function of Religious Market Shares, NELS:88 and ECLS-K
Kindergarten Eighth Grade High School40   
 
Appendix Table 1. Tests of Proposition 1: Natural Logarithm of Enrollment in Different 
Denominations of Religious Schools 
Variables  
Elementary  Secondary  Overall 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Catholic school enrollment 
Log(Catholic Members)  0.662*  0.312*  0.531*  0.241*  0.684*  0.516* 
(0.054)  (0.040)  -0.063  (0.099)  (0.054)  (0.085) 
Log(Demographic 
controls)  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.853  0.976  0.703  0.915  0.850  0.966 
Observations  1,240  1,075  500  421  1,248  458 
Evangelical school enrollment 
Log(Evangelical 
Members)  0.490*  0.389*  0.659*  0.587*  0.513*  0.505* 
(0.072)  (0.077)  (0.080)  (0.118)  (0.073)  (0.086) 
Log(Demographic 
controls)  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.853  0.914  0.719  0.826  0.849  0.904 
Observations  1,851  1,192  1,443  835  1,854  899 
Mainline school enrollment 
Log(Mainline Members)  0.079*  0.359*  -0.021*  -0.308  0.110*  0.212* 
(0.140)  (0.403)  (0.277)  (1.190)  (0.151)  (0.537) 
Log(Demographic 
controls)  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.539  0.812  0.520  0.526  0.511  0.814 
Observations  475  222  215  110  493  129 
Notes: 
1) Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to clustering at the state level. 
2) Demographic controls include median income, density of population, percent of population 
at school-age, percent African–Americans in the population, percent Hispanics in the 
population, population, percent of population that lives in a rural area, average number of 
people per household and pupil to teacher ratio, as well as their square terms. In addition we 
also include state fixed effects and the market share of other denominations. 
3) Estimates marked with “*” are significantly different from one at the five percent level. 
4) Estimation samples include only those counties with positive enrollment levels in the given 
denomination (because the log of zero is undefined).  
 